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Cheating for material gain is a destructive phenomenon in any society. We examine the
extent to which people care about the victims of their unethical behavior—be they a
group of people or an individual—and whether they are sensitive to the degree of harm
or cost that they cause to these victims. The results of three studies suggest that when
a group (rather than a single individual) is the victim of one’s behavior, the incidence of
cheating increases only if the harm to the group is presented in global terms—such that
the cheating might be justified by the relatively minor harm caused to each individual in
the group (Studies #1 and #3). However, when the harm or cost to each individual in the
group is made explicit, the tendency to cheat the group is no longer apparent and the
tendency to cheat increases when the harm caused is minor—regardless of whether the
victim is an individual or a group of people (Study #2). Individual differences in rational
and intuitive thinking appear to play different roles in the decision to cheat different type
of opponents: individual opponents seem to trigger the subject’s intuitive thinking which
restrains the urge to cheat, whereas groups of opponents seem to trigger the subject’s
rational mode of thinking which encourage cheating.
Keywords: ethics, morality, dishonesty, the singularity effect
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a contractor who purchased all materials needed for a renovation job he is about to begin.
When is he more likely to cheat about the cost of the materials and claim they costed more than
what he actually paid: when the homeowner is a single person, or when the work is done for a
condominium with several families?
In the present study, we set out to examine whether people care about who bears the
consequences of their unethical behavior, and whether the degree of harm they cause when acting
unethically plays any part in their decision. Specifically, we compare the action of deceiving a group
of people as opposed to a single individual, and gage whether varying the degree of harm caused
has any effect on people’s behavior—either when presented in global terms, or when the respective
harm to each individual in the group is stated explicitly.
People often engage in dishonest behaviors for material gain (Lewicki et al., 1997; Brief et al.,
2001). However, research in the past decade consistently shows that people cheat only to the extent
that they can maintain a self-concept of integrity (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Ayal and Gino, 2011).
Thus, they are more likely to cheat when they feel they can justify their behavior, and the degree
of cheating depends on the extent to which they can justify it to themselves (e.g., Shalvi et al.,
2011).
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However, little research has been done on the effect of the
identity of the victim of unethical behavior on the tendency to
cheat. Gneezy (2005) found that participants in his study were
less likely to use deception to increase their payoffs at someone
else’s expense. However, in a competitive environment, where
participants felt vulnerable in relation to their opponents, they
were inclined to cheat, as this appears to have provided them with
a strong justification to do so (Atanasov and Dana, 2011).
In many cases, it is easier to justify cheating a group by
thinking that the harm caused would be distributed among
several people, rather than borne by a single individual. Recently,
Kesternich et al. (2014) analyzed distributional preferences in
games in which decision makers choose the provision of a good
that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers.
They found that participants take into account the welfare of
all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, they attach
similar weights to small and large groups of players alike, and
tend to ignore large costs to the other party when these are shared
by many individuals.
Cognitive research of people’s perceptions of single individuals
and groups (e.g., Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Susskind et al.,
1999) suggests that a single individual—in contrast to a group of
individuals—is viewed as a psychologically coherent unit, which
triggers a more extensive processing of information and active
integration of the information in real time. As a result, people
tend to be more emphatic in their assessment of an individual
than of a group, and respond more quickly and confidently
when asked to make a judgment about them. In contrast, the
comparatively indistinct image of a group makes it easier for
subjects to remain detached from it, and thereby easier to deceive
for one’s own benefit.
Research on pro-social decision making has confirmed that an
individual victim elicits greater empathy and help than a group of
victims in the same circumstances (e.g., Small and Loewenstein,
2003; Kogut and Ritov, 2005). Slovic (2007) suggests that this
is because it is easier for people to put themselves in the
shoes of one person than in the shoes of many. In addition,
decisions about groups are expected to be more rational (i.e., take
into account “objective” considerations), while decisions about
individual victims are expected to be governed more by emotions
(Kogut, 2011).
Given the global, more impersonal perception of the
group, and the possibility of justifying one’s behavior by the
comparatively lesser harm inflicted on each individual in a group,
we predicted that participants would tend to cheat a group of
opponents more often than a single individual. Furthermore we
examined whether informing participants of the specific harm
or cost caused to each individual in a group of opponents
would attenuate the tendency to cheat the group more than the
individual.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies, in
which participants were asked to make private predictions of the
outcomes of a series of coin tosses while playing against a single
opponent or a group of four opponents, and receive payments
according to the accuracy of their predictions (Zimerman et al.,
2014). Since only the participants knew if their predictions were
accurate, this task enabled them to earn more money by giving
false reports of their predictions. Since we did not monitor the
actual outcomes, we could not determine at the individual level
whether or not a participant lied about their predictions, but we
could compare their performance on an aggregate basis to that
predicted by chance (see Batson et al., 1997; Shalvi et al., 2012;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
In the present study, each correct prediction credited the
player with a fixed amount of money—but unlike the above
studies, these credits came at the expense of the earnings of
an opponent, who was either a single individual or a group.
In addition, while the amount earned by the players for each
reported correct prediction remained constant in all conditions,
the attendant cost to the opponent was varied (either High
or Low). This enables us to examine exclusively the effect of
the damage causes to the opponent on the tendency to cheat.
In Study #1, the participant was informed only of the overall
cost to the opponent group of his or her deception, without
reference to the cost to each individual in it; in Study #2, they
were informed of the cost incurred by each individual in the
group; Study #3 included a direct comparison between the three
conditions: a single opponent and the two group conditions that
were examined in Studies #1 and #2, (i.e., with and without
explicit information regarding the cost to each individual in the
group).
STUDY #1
Method
One hundred and forty two undergraduate students (69 of whom
were women, M = 25.24; SD = 3.96) were invited to participate
in a short online experiment, and told that 10% of them would
be randomly selected to earn money in accordance with their
performance in the experiment.
The experiment involved a short task in which each
participant was asked to toss a coin twenty consecutive times,
after predicting the outcome in each case: for every correct
prediction they made, they would earn a fixed amount of money,
at the expense of their opponent’s account (which would start
with a particular amount). After each coin flip, they were asked
to note the outcome on a separate screen, and indicate whether
their prediction was correct or not.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions of a 2 × 2 between-subject design
involving two variables: Cost to Opponent (being either high—
NIS 2.0 ∼ USD 0.50), or low (NIS 0.50 ∼ USD 0.13), and
Opponent Type (an individual or a group of four people).
Although the Cost to Opponent varied between the High
and Low conditions, the amount earned by the participant was
constant in all instances—NIS 2. Thus, if they predicted all 20
tosses correctly, they could potentially earn as much as NIS 40
(∼US $10)—however, this would be at their opponent’s expense.
Table 1 describes the four conditions, in which the Opponent
Type (individual or group) and initial balance varied. As can be
seen in the table, since the profit earned by the player remained
constant in all conditions (2 NIS for each correct prediction) we
kept the cost for the opponent group equal to the participants’
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TABLE 1 | The four experimental conditions.
Cost to Opponent Opponent: One individual Opponent: Four individuals
Low (NIS 0.5) Initial amount: NIS10
Deduction for each correct prediction: NIS 0.5
Initial balance: NIS 40
Deduction: NIS 2.0 total from the group as a whole (NIS 0.5 each)
High (NIS 2.0) Initial amount: NIS 40
Deduction for each correct prediction: NIS 2.0
Initial balance: NIS 160
Deduction: NIS 8.0 from the group as a whole (NIS 2.0 each)
earnings, either at the group level (a total of NIS 2 per group,
i.e., 0.5 for each individual in the group) or at the individual level
(NIS 2 per each individual in the group, i.e., a total of NIS 8). The
cost in the single opponent condition was adjusted to the costs
per each individual in the group, and was either NIS 2 or NIS 0.5
(in the high and the low conditions, respectively). Participants
in each condition were informed about the payoffs to the self
and to their opponent precisely as reported in the table, without
indication of the respective cost to each individual in the group
condition.
Since research on the singularity effect highlighted the role of
emotions and intuition in decisions that favor a specific target,
we sought to examine the extent to which individual differences
in Intuitive-Experiential and Analytical-Rational thinking are
related to the decision to act unethically toward single opponents
and toward groups. Hence, at the end of the experiment
participants were asked to complete the short version of
the Rational-Experiential Inventory questionnaire (REI; Epstein
et al., 1996), comprising 10 items that gage individual differences
between Intuitive-Experiential and Analytical-Rational thinking.
(Cronbach’s Alphas 0.86 and 0.82 for the Analytical-rational
and the Intuitive-experiential scales, respectively; the correlation
between the two scales was not significant (r = 0.10, p= 0.30).
Results and Discussion
Means (SDs) of the reported correct predictions are reported in
Table 2. Overall, participants reported 11.17 correct predictions
(SD = 2.37)—a significantly higher outcome than the expected
chance performance rate (10); t(141) = 5.88, p < 0.001. This
held true for both the Individual Opponent condition [10.82,
t(67) = 2.71, p = 0.009] and the Group Opponent condition
[11.49, t(73)= 5.8, p < 0.001].
To examine the role played by Opponent Type (individual
or group), of the Cost to Opponent (High or Low), and of the
two REI subscales (intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational
thinking) in predicting the number of correct coin-tosses
reported by the participants (0–20), we conducted a multiple
TABLE 2 | Mean (SDs) number of reported correct coin toss predictions, in
each of the four conditions (Study #1).
Cost to Opponent Individual
Opponent
Group of 4
opponents
Total
Low (NIS 0.5) M = 10.72 M = 11.42 M = 11.09
(SD = 2.67) (SD = 2.29) (SD = 2.49)
High (NIS 2.0) M = 10.91 M = 11.55 M = 11.25
(SD = 2.38) (SD = 2.14) (SD = 2.26)
Total M = 10.82 M = 11.49
(SD = 2.51) (SD = 2.20)
regression analysis. As is recommended for binomial
distributions, we performed an ARCSINE transformation
of the proportion of correct predictions. The predictors
included all four main effects, all two-way interactions and
three-way interactions between these variables (see Table 3).
The overall explained variance of the model was significant
F(11,130) = 1.92, p = 0.04, R2 = 0.14. The Opponent
Type variable made a significant unique contribution to the
model (B = −3.53, t = −2.22, p = 0.028). As expected,
participants in the Group condition reported more correct
predictions (M = 11.49) than those in the Individual Opponent
condition (M = 10.82)—indicating a higher tendency to false
reporting when the opponent was a group. In addition, both
the interaction between Opponent Type and the Intuitive-
Experiential subscale (B = 0.96, t = 2.27, p = 0.025) and
between Opponent Type and the Analytical-Rational subscale
(B = 0.89, t = 2.21, p = 0.029) were significant. These
were plotted in Figure 1 (right and left, respectively), as
recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and
Richter (2006)1. As it demonstrates, when the opponent was
1According to Aiken and West (1991) in order to examine an interaction between
two independent variables found in a regression analysis, the simple slopes of the
regression should be plotted, using two meaningful points to anchor each line.
Theoretically, one could choose any two values within the observed range of the
DV to plot each line. It is most common to choose the mean, 1 SD below the mean,
and 1 SD above the mean of a continuous variable.
TABLE 3 | The regression model – Study #1.
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Significant
B Standard Error
(Constant) 1.982 0.300 6.613 0.000
Cost to Opponent 0.164 1.100 0.149 0.882
Opponent Type −3.531 1.591 −2.219 0.028∗
Analytical-Rational 0.034 0.071 0.476 0.635
Intuitive-Experiential −0.128 0.052 −2.452 0.016∗
Opponent ∗
Rational
0.889 0.401 2.215 0.029∗
Opponent ∗
Intuitive
0.957 0.421 2.275 0.025∗
Opponent ∗ Cost −0.023 0.096 −0.240 0.811
Cost ∗ Rational −0.144 0.286 −0.505 0.615
Cost ∗ Intuitive −0.100 0.284 −0.352 0.726
Cost ∗ Rational ∗
Intuitive
0.058 0.075 0.783 0.435
Opponent ∗
Rational ∗ Intuitive
−0.236 0.107 −2.200 0.030∗
∗p ≤ 0.05.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean number of reported correct predictions, as a function of Opponent Type and the two REI sub-scales—plotted as recommended by
Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and Richter (2006), one SD below and one SD above the mean of each subscale in each of the Opponent Type
conditions.
a single individual, Intuitive-Experiential ratings correlated
negatively with correct predictions, the higher the Intuitive-
Experiential tendency the lower the tendency to cheat. In
addition, higher Analytical-Rational ratings were linked to
increased incidence of cheating when the opponent was a
group, and less so when the opponent was an individual. The
three-way interaction between Opponent Type and the two
Rational-Experiential scales was also significant (B = −0.24,
t = −2.20, p = 0.030). No other significant interactions were
found: in particular, the Cost to Opponent was not significant
(t = 0.15, p = 0.88), nor did it significantly interact with any of
the other variables.
The results of Study #1 indicate that people tend to cheat
a group of opponents more often than an individual one—
even when the harm or cost to each individual in the group
is the same as that caused to the individual in the Single
Opponent condition. Moreover, each condition appears to trigger
a different mode of thinking: when faced with an individual
opponent, the subject’s Intuitive thinking tends to restrain
their urge to cheat, whereas when faced with a group of
opponents, the subject’s Rational mode of thinking appears to
encourage cheating. These results are in line with research on
the singularity effect—namely, that a single opponent triggers a
spontaneous emotional response in the subject that tends to result
in decisions that are more favorable to the opponent (Kogut,
2009).
In the present study participants in the Group condition
were informed of the cost of their deception to the group
as a whole, without reference to the cost to each individual
within the group. Thus, informing participants of the cost
incurred by each individual in the opponent group may
make people care more about each such individual, thereby
making it more difficult for them to use the comparatively
minor harm caused to each individual in the group as an
excuse for cheating. To test this possibility, in Study #2 we
replicated Study #1, but added information about the cost
incurred by each group member in the Group Opponent
conditions.
STUDY #2
Participants: One hundred and fifty two undergraduate students
(81 of whom were women—M = 24.8, SD = 1.89), who were
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions
of the same 2 × 2 between-subject design as in Study #1. Here
too, they were invited to take part in a short online experiment,
and told that 10% of them would be randomly selected to earn
money according to their performance in the experiment. We
used the same method as in Study #1—with one difference: in
the Group Opponent condition, the participants were informed
of the respective cost of their deception to each individual in
the opponent group, as well as the total cost to the group as a
whole.
Results and Discussion
The means (SDs) of the correct predictions reported in
each condition are presented in Table 4. Overall, participants
reported 12.21 correct predictions (SD = 2.95)—once again,
significantly higher than the expected chance prediction rate
(10); t(151) = 9.24, p < 0.000. This was true for both
reports in the Single Opponent condition [12.32, t(70) = 6.94,
p = 0.001] and in the Group condition [12.11, t(80) = 6.19,
p < 0.001].
To examine the role of the two independent variables
(Opponent Type and Cost to Opponent) in predicting the
TABLE 4 | Mean number of reported correct predictions (SD), in each of
the four conditions (Study #2).
Cost to
Opponent
Single Opponent Group of 4 Total
Low M = 12.97 M = 12.47 M = 12.69
(0.5 NIS) (SD = 2.94) (SD = 3.11) (SD = 3.09)
High M = 11.69 M = 11.71 M = 11.70
(2 NIS) (SD = 2.42) (SD = 3.00) (SD = 2.71)
Total M = 12.32 M = 12.11
(SD = 2.82) (SD = 3.01)
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TABLE 5 | The three experimental conditions – Study #3.
A Single opponent A global group A detailed group
Initial amount: NIS 40
Deduction for each correct prediction: NIS 2.0
Initial balance: NIS 160
Deduction: NIS 8.0 from the group as a whole
Initial balance: NIS 160
Deduction: NIS 8.0 from the group (i.e., NIS 2.0 from each individual)
participants’ reports, we conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the
transformed ARCSINE data of the proportion of the correct
prediction of coin tosses as a function of the Opponent Type
(individual or group) and the Cost to Opponent (High or Low).
The results revealed no main effect for the Opponent Type
F(1,148) = 0.15, (NS). However, the main effect for the Cost to
Opponent approached significance [F(1,148) = 3.72, p = 0.056,
η2p = 0.025]—in that participants may have reported overall
greater success in their predictions under the Low Cost condition
(M = 12.69) than under the High Cost condition (M = 11.70).
No significant interaction was found [F(1,148)= 0.36, NS].
The results of Study #2 indicate that when the actual cost
to each individual in the opponent group is stated explicitly,
participants likely care about the harm they may cause to others,
irrespective of whether it is a single individual or a group. In
these instances, the magnitude of harm or cost caused comes into
play: when the harm or cost to each individual in the opponent
group is minor, participants are inclined to cheat more often. In
other words, informing the participant of the harm caused to each
opponent group member appears to increase the participant’s
awareness of each individual in the group. It also appears to make
it more difficult for the participants to use the relative minor harm
to each individual in the group as a pretext for cheating (especially
in the High Cost condition).
Taking the results of the two experiments together suggests
that when the partner is a group, the extent of cheating depends
on the way in which the information about the damage is
presented: When the damage appears globally, without specifying
the cost to each individual, people tend to cheat a group more
than a single opponent; while, when the exact damage caused
to each individual in the group is explicitly given, level of
cheating groups and single opponents does not significantly
differ. However, the two studies do not allow a direct comparison
between the two groups (with and without explicit details on
the extent of damage caused to each individual in the group),
since different samples were examined, which differ in the overall
extent of cheating. Hence, we conducted another study with three
between subject groups: a single recipient, a global group (in
which the damage caused to the group appears globally) and a
detailed-group (in which the damage caused to each individual
in the group is explicitly specified). In this study we kept the
cost to each single opponent (whether an individual, or an
individual in a group) constant (always two shekels, which is
equal to the amount earned by the participant for each correct
report).
STUDY #3
Participants: One hundred and nine undergraduate students (56
women—M = 25.87, SD= 3.97), who were randomly assigned to
one of the three experimental between-subject conditions: (1) a
single recipient, (2) a group of four recipients with information
on the respective cost of a deception to the group as a whole
(hereafter “Global-group”), and (3) a group of four recipients
with information on the respective cost of a deception to each
individual in the opponent group, as well as the total cost
to the group as a whole (hereafter “Detailed-group”). Here
too, participants were invited to take part in a short online
experiment, and told that 10% of them would be randomly
selected to earn money according to their performance in the
experiment. The method was the same as in the high cost
conditions in Studies #1 and #2 in the previous studies (see
Table 5). In addition, as in Study #1, participants were asked to
complete the short version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory
questionnaire (REI; Epstein et al., 1996), at the end of the
experiment (Cronbach’s Alphas 0.80 and 0.85 for the Analytical-
rational and the Intuitive-experiential scales, respectively; the
correlation between the two scales was not significant (r=−0.07,
p= 0.41).
Results and Discussion
Mean (SDs) number of reported correct coin toss predictions, in
each of the three conditions are presented in Table 6. Overall,
participants reported 11.06 correct predictions (SD = 2.69)—
a significantly higher outcome than the expected chance
performance rate (10); t(108) = 4.12, p < 0.001. However, in
the Single Opponent condition, reported correct predictions were
not significantly different from the ones expected by chance
[10.62, t(33)= 1.33, p= 0.191]. The difference between reported
correct predictions in the Detailed-Group condition and the
expected outcome by chance (10.84) approached significance
[t(31) = 1.97, p < 0.058]; while reports in the Global-Group
condition were significantly different than the expected by chance
[11.57, t(42)= 3.61, p < 0.01].
To examine the role played by Condition (Single, Global-
group, and Detailed-group), and of the two REI subscales
(Intuitive-experiential and Analytical-rational thinking) in
predicting the number of correct coin-tosses reported by
the participants (0–20), we conducted a multiple regression
analysis on the ARCSINE transformation of the proportion
of the correct prediction of coin tosses (see Table 7). Two
dummy variables were created (Single and Detailed) using the
TABLE 6 | Mean (SDs) number of reported correct coin toss predictions, in
each of the three conditions (Study #3).
Condition Mean (SD)
Single Opponent 10.62 (2.70)
Detailed-Group 10.84 (2.37)
Global-Group 11.57 (2.88)
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TABLE 7 | The regression model – Study #3.
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Significant
B Standard Error
(Constant) 1.908 0.425 4.484 0.000
Single 0.549 0.272 2.014 0.047∗
Detailed-group 0.563 0.338 1.667 0.099
Rational −0.198 0.133 −1.489 0.140
Intuitive −0.170 0.176 −0.967 0.336
Rational × Intuitive 0.120 0.056 2.161 0.033∗
Single × Intuitive −0.025 0.093 −0.269 0.788
Detailed-group × Intuitive −0.247 0.118 −2.086 0.040∗
Single × Rational −0.245 0.080 −3.074 0.003∗∗
Detailed-group × Rational −0.023 0.087 −0.263 0.793
∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
Global group condition as the comparison group. Thus, the
predictors included all four main effects (the Single and the
Detailed-group dummies, the intuitive-experiential and the
analytical-rational thinking scales and all two-way interactions
between these variables. The overall explained variance of the
model was significant F(9,99) = 3.62, p = 0.001, R2 = 24.8.
The contribution of the Single dummy – comparing the
Global-group to the Single opponent conditions was significant
(B = 0.55, t = 2.01, p = 0.047); such that participants in
the Global-group reported more correct predictions (11.57)
than participants in the Single opponent condition (10.62)—
indicating a higher tendency to false reporting when the
opponent was a Global-group, replicating the results of Study
#1. The main effect of the Detailed-group dummy, comparing
the Global-group to the Detailed-group, approached significance
(B = 0.56, t = 1.67, p = 0.099); such that reported correct
predictions were higher in the Global group than in the
Detailed group (10.84). In addition, the interaction between
the Single dummy and the Analytical-Rational subscale was
significant (B = −0.24, t = −3.07, p = 0.003); such that
higher Analytical-Rational ratings were linked to increased
incidence of cheating only in the Global-group condition;
while in the single opponent condition higher Analytical-
Rational ratings were liked to a decrease in the number of
reported correct predictions. Finally, the interaction between
the Intuitive-experiential scale and the Detailed-dummy
was significant (B = −0.25, t = −2.09, p = 0.04), showing
that intuitive thinking is correlated with higher reports of
correct predictions in the Global group condition, and with
fewer reports of correct predictions in the Detailed-group
condition.
In summary, the results of the third study support the
conclusions of Studies #1 and #2 by showing that people
tend to cheat a group more than a specific individual, mostly
when the cost or harm to the group is presented in global
terms. However, when the cost to each individual in the
group is explicitly given, participants tend to cheat groups
and individual opponents to a similar degree. The results
also support the idea that higher analytical-rational thinking
is related to the tendency to cheat a global group, replicating
the results of Study #1. However, the results for the Intuitive-
experiential scale were only partially consistent with the
results of Study #1 by demonstrating a decrease in reported
number of correct predictions in the Detailed-group condition
(replicating the direction of results found in Study #1 for single
opponents). However, in the global group condition the Intuitive-
experiential scale was correlated with higher reports of correct
predictions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Cheating is a destructive phenomenon in any society. When
presented with an opportunity to profit by cheating, most people
will do so—but only to a limited extent, to maintain their
positive self-image as honest individuals (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008).
However, when given a pretext for such behavior, they are more
likely to cheat and to profit at the expense of others (e.g., Shalvi
et al., 2011). Our results confirm that participants do cheat to
some extent when faced with either a group of opponents or
an individual one. However, if the consequent cost or harm
to the group is presented in global terms, participants tend to
cheat more often than when the opponent is an individual—
perhaps because they imagine that the cost to each individual
in the group is comparatively minor (Studies #1 and #3).
Conversely, when they are explicitly told of the cost to each
individual in the opponent group, participants tend to heed
this and cheat groups and single opponents to the same degree
(Studies #2 and #3). Furthermore, in such cases, participants are
sensitive to the degree of harm or cost they cause, and tend
to cheat more often when the harm they cause is less severe—
regardless of whether their opponent is a single person or a
group (Study #2). Since the amount of money earned from each
correct prediction was the same in all studies, and is easily
divisible by four (the number of people in the group), one
might expect people to calculate the cost to each individual in
the opponent group and show greater sensitivity as a result,
even when this information is not explicitly stated. However,
the results of our studies suggest that participants act only on
the information given to them: when the cost of the deception
to the group is presented in global terms, they appear to use
the undefined cost to each individual opponent as a pretext for
cheating.
As previously noted, research suggests that people perceive
groups in a more global and impersonal fashion, which may
induce a greater psychological distance and diminish their level
of caring (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Slovic, 2007). However, making
the presence of each individual in a group more salient may
increase a subject’s level of concern for the group (Bartels and
Burnett, 2011). This may have occurred in Studies #2 and #3,
when participants were explicitly told of the respective loss that
each member of the opponent group would incur as a result
of their deception. This finding is in line with the self-concept
maintenance model put forward by Mazar and Ariely (2006),
which states that portraying unethical actions as more offensive
may increase the internal cost of engaging in such actions, and
discourage people from behaving dishonestly.
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According to the standard economic model, individuals aim
to maximize their own profit. A “rational” individual is therefore
one who chooses the option that is expected to yield them the
greatest profit (e.g., Hobbes and Macpherson, 1968; Smith, 1999).
From this perspective, a person’s decision to be honest depends
only on the expected external benefits and costs to themselves
(Lewicki, 1983; Hechter, 1990). The results of Studies #1 and #3—
according to which individual differences in Analytical-Rational
thinking predict a greater incidence of cheating—are in line with
this model. However, this prediction was significant only when
the opponent was a global group—not a single individual. The
relatively detached perception of the group (compared with the
perception of a single individual) allows for more “rational”
thinking (as defined by the standard economic model), and
appears to increase the incidence of cheating for monetary
gain. Interestingly, when the opponent is a single individual
(which possibly fosters greater perspective taking—Slovic, 2007),
Intuitive-Experiential thinking tends to come into play, resulting
in diminished cheating—possibly due to the subject’s greater
empathy toward the opponent. This pattern was also found for
the Detailed-group, a group-setting that makes the individuals
in the group more salient (Study #3). However, we did not find
a replication for this direction in the single opponent condition
in Study #3, and it is for future research to further explore this
issue.
In many real-life situations, the precise harm caused by one’s
unethical behavior is not readily apparent. Our results suggest
that in such cases people tend to cheat more often when their
opponent is a group (as opposed to an individual)—perhaps
on the assumption that the harm to each group member is
minor compared with the harm that would have been caused to
a single individual. Research has revealed various situations in
which people fail to notice that their behavior violates their own
moral standards (Gino et al., 2010; Bazerman et al., 2011; Schurr
et al., 2012). Our research suggests that when considering a cost
for a group of people, providing explicit information about the
respective harm or cost that it would cause to each individual
group member may reduce the incidence of such undesirable
behavior, but only in cases when the relative cost to each group
member is significant.
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